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Abstract
We introduce a new mathematical model of multi-agent reinforcement learning,
the Multi-Agent Informational Learning Process or “MAILP” model. The model
is based on the notion that agents have policies for a certain amount of informa-
tion, models how this information iteratively evolves and propagates throughmany
agents. This model is very general, and the only meaningful assumption made is
that learning for individual agents progressively slows over time.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background and Related Work
1.1.1 Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) methods seek to learn a policy (a function which takes the observation
and returns an action) that achieves the maximum expected total reward within a given environment.
Single-agent environments are traditionally modeled as a Markov Decision Process (“MDP”) or a
partially-observable MDP (“POMDP”) Boutilier (1996). An MDP models decision-making as a
process where an agent repeatedly takes a single action, receives a reward, and transitions to a new
state (receiving complete knowledge of the state). A POMDP extends this to include environments
where the agent may not be able to observe the whole state.
MDPs can be formally defined as:
Definition 1. A Markov Decision Process (MDP) is a 4-tuple 〈S,A, P,R〉, where:
• S is a finite set of states.
• A is the (finite) set of actions available for the agent to take.
• P : S × A × S → [0, 1] is the transition function. It has the property that ∀s ∈ S, a ∈ A,∑
s′∈S P (s, a, s
′) = 1.
• R : S ×A× S → R is the reward function.
According to this definition, the agent is in one of several possible states, given by S, and performs
one of the possible actions, given by A. When the agent is in state s ∈ S and takes action a ∈ A,
the transition function P (s, a, s′) gives the probability that the agent will transition into state s′ ∈ S
(i.e., if st and at denote the state and action, respectively, at time t, P (s, a, s
′) = Pr(st+1 = s
′ |
st = s, at = a)), while the reward function R(s, a, s
′) specifies the agent’s reward. Classical
reinforcement learning aims to devise a strategy for the agent to take that maximizes its expected
reward.
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Definition 2. A Partially-Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) is a 6-tuple
〈S,A, P,R,Ω, O〉, where:
• S is the (finite) set of states.
• A is the set of actions available to the agent.
• P : S ×A×S → [0, 1] is the transition function. It has the same property as in a standard
MDP, i.e., ∀s ∈ S, ∀a ∈ A,
∑
s′∈S P (s, a, s
′) = 1.
• R : S ×A× S → R is the reward function.
• Ω is the set of possible observations the agent may perceive.
• O : A × S × Ω is the observation function. It has the property that ∀a ∈ A, s ∈
S,
∑
ω∈ΩO(a, s, ω) = 1.
The view of the POMDP is similar to that of the standard MDP: at each time step t, the agent begins
in state st ∈ S and selects an action at ∈ A to perform; P (s, a, s
′) = Pr(st+1 = s
′ | st = s, at =
a) specifies the probability of transitioning into state s′ from state s when selecting action a; and
R(s, a, s′) is the reward the agent receives when selecting action a in state s and transitioning into
state s′. However, the agent does not see the full state st at time t, but only sees an observation
ωt ∈ Ω. The observation function O(a, s, ω) = Pr(ωt+1 = ω
′ | at = a, st+1 = s) specifies the
probability that the agent sees observation ω after selecting action a and transitioning into the true
state s. At any point in time, the agent does not know the true state, but instead can only compute a
probability distribution on possible states, called the belief distribution, based on the observations it
has seen and the actions it has performed.
A policy π : Ω × A → [0, 1] gives a strategy for the agent: given an observation ω ∈ Ω, the
policy gives a probability distribution on actions π(ω, ·) (and thus, it has the property that ∀ω ∈
Ω,
∑
a∈A π(ω, a) = 1)) for the agent to take. The goal of reinforcement learning is to learn an
optimal (i.e., one which maximizes expected reward) policy, denoted π∗.
1.1.2 Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning
In multi-agent reinforcement learning, there are several models similar to MDPs (or POMDPs) that
account for multiple agents. Perhaps the most simple model for multi-agent learning is the aptly
namedMulti-agent MDP (or “MMDP”) introduced by Boutilier (1996).
Definition 3. AMulti-agent Markov Decision Process (MMDP) is a tuple 〈S, N, {Ai}i∈[N ], P,R〉,
where:
• S is a finite set of states.
• N is the number of agents. Then, the set of agents is [N ].
• {Ai}i∈[N ] is a family of sets where Ai is the set of actions available for agent i to take.
• P : S × A1 ×A2 × · · · × AN × S → [0, 1] is the transition function. It has the property
that ∀s ∈ S, ∀(a1, a2, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
i∈[N ]Ai,
∑
s′∈S P (s, a1, a2, . . . , aN , s
′) = 1.
• R : S ×A1 ×A2 × · · · × AN × S → R is the reward function.
The work of Boutilier (1996) was interested in studying optimal planning and learning in coordinated
decision making processes. In such settings, agents work cooperatively toward a single shared goal,
and thus it was natural for this purpose to have a single reward function that specifies the shared
reward. However, there are many other natural RL settings in which it makes sense for agents to
have separate rewards.
The Stochastic Games model (sometimes called Markov Games), introduced by Shapley (1953) in
the study of game theory. This model differs from MMDPs in that it has a separate reward function
for each agent.
Definition 4 (Stochastic Game). A Stochastic Game (POSG) is a tuple:
〈S, N, {Ai}i∈[N ], P, {Ri}i∈[N ], 〉
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where:
• S is the set of possible states.
• N is the number of agents. The set of agents is [N ].
• Ai is the set of possible actions for agent i.
• P : S × A1 ×A2 × · · · × AN × S → [0, 1] is the transition function. It has the property
that ∀s ∈ S, ∀(a1, a2, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
i∈[N ]Ai,
∑
s′∈S P (s, a1, a2, . . . , aN , s
′) = 1.
• Ri : S ×A1 ×A2 × · · · × AN × S → R is the reward function for agent i.
Both MMDPs and Stochastic Games assume that the current state is fully observable. In this sense,
they can be seen as multi-agent generalizations of standard MDPs. To model settings with partial
observability (as with POMDPs), we can instead utilize a decentralized POMD, or “Dec-POMDP”,
introduced in Bernstein et al. (2002) as a partially-observable generalization of MMDPs. For sitau-
ations in which agents each have their own reward function, we can instead define a partially-
observable Stochastic Game, or POSG (see, e.g., Lowe et al. (2017)). We present the definition
of the latter below.
Definition 5 (Partially-Observable Stochastic Game). A Partially-Observable Stochastic Game
(POSG) is a tuple 〈S, N, {Ai}, P, {Ri}, {Ωi}, {Oi}〉, where:
• S is the set of possible states.
• N is the number of agents. The set of agents is [N ].
• Ai is the set of possible actions for agent i.
• P : S ×
∏
i∈[N ]Ai × S → [0, 1] is the transition function. It has the property that ∀s ∈
S, ∀(a1, a2, . . . , aN ) ∈
∏
i∈[N ]Ai,
∑
s′∈S P (s, a1, a2, . . . , aN , s
′) = 1.
• Ri : S ×A1 ×A2 × · · · × AN × S → R is the reward function for agent i.
• Ωi is the set of possible observations for agent i.
• Oi : Ai × S × Ωi → [0, 1] is the observation function.
∑
ω∈Ωi
Oi(a, s, ω) = 1 for all
a ∈ Ai and s ∈ S.
1.1.3 Nonstationarity
In single agent RL, a nonstationary environment is one that changes during learning (Choi et al.,
2000; Chades et al., 2012). In MARL, the term typically refers to nonstationarity arising from the
behaviors of other agents (which must be learned as parts of the environment) changing as they
learn Matignon et al. (2012). This often results in agents having to iteratively relearn each other’s
policies to achieve a globally optimal set of policies.
In single-agent learning, Choi et al. (2000) considered nonstationary systems such as elevator con-
trol, where the environmental conditions might change over the course of a day or week. They intro-
duced hidden-mode MDPs (HM-MDP) to model non-stationary environments; however, this model
is not well suited for the nonstationarity of multi-agent learning, since it assumes the environment
will only take on a small number of possible “modes” (a single agent’s view of the environment de-
pends on all other agents’ policies, so the number of possible modes would be massive) and that the
mode does not change often (as agents learn, their strategies may change constantly and frequently).
The HM-MDP model can be seen as a more restricted kind of POMDP, since every hidden-mode
MDP has an equivalent POMDP. Later work Chades et al. (2012) introduced another model, called
Mixed Observability MDP (MOMDP), which can also be seen as a special kind of POMDP; they
showed that HM-MDPs and MOMDPs are both PSPACE-complete to solve.
In MARL, the nonstationarity problem caused by having multiple agents learning simultaneously
was further studied in the context of deep MARL by Omidshafiei et al. (2017) who formally defined
what it means for an individual agent’s process to be stationary.
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1.2 Our Contributions
While models like POSGs describe the environment in which agents act, they do not describe the
process by which these agents learn how they will act. We propose a new model, Multi-Agent
Informational Learning Process, which does not attempt to model the games or environments in
which agents will act, but rather attempts to model how algorithms gradually learn policies over time.
We do this by considering learning as a process of acquiring information about the environment
and other agents. The Multi-Agent Informational Learning Processattempts to provide a way of
modeling how much information agents have learned about different aspects of their environment
(and the other agents in the environment), so as to provide a new perspective with which to view how
quickly different algorithms are able to learn policies. Our model attempts to capture the problem
of nonstationarity by considering an agent as losing information when another agent’s behavior
changes due to learning a more effective policy.
2 Model Overview
2.1 Coordination Tensor Sets
Here, we present the notion of a coordination tensor set of a game. The coordination tensor set is
a collection of values that describe how much certain agents must coordinate their strategies in an
optimal policy.
For convenience we define [N ]−i := [N ]\{i}. Formally, we define Ci,G ∈ [0, 1] for an agent i and a
group of agents G ⊆ [N ]−i as the “coordination value” for i with respect to G. This value describes
how much an optimal policy for agent i depends on the collective behavior of the agents in G. In our
model, Ci,G will correspond to the amount of information agent i must learn about the behavior of
G as a group. We normalize the total amount of information any single agent must learn to 1 so that
for every agent,
∑
G⊆[N ]−i
Ci,G ≤ 1. The inequality here is to account for the information agent i
must learn about the stationary portions of its environment (e.g., states/observations, and its reward
function); we define Ci,env := 1−
∑
G⊆[N ]−i
Ci,G to be the amount of information that agent i must
learn that does not depend on the behavior of any other agent or group of agents. The collection of
all coordination values {Ci,G}i∈[N ],G⊆[N ]−i is the coordination tensor set.
2.1.1 Modeling Learning through Sequential Information Updates
Our model describes the process of learning via an iterative update process that describes how much
information is learned by an agent in each (discrete) time step of the learning process. First, we
define Ii(t) ∈ [0, 1] to be the amount of information agent i has at time t, so that Ii(t) = 1
corresponds to the situation where agent i has learned all the information necessary to have learned
an optimal policy.
We further break down the information each agent has in terms of howmuch information it has about
each group of agents G ⊆ [N ]−i as well as how much information it has about the environment.
Formally, we define Ii,(G)(t) ∈ [0, Ci,G] to be the amount of information agent i has about the
collective behavior of G (relative to the total information i needs to learn in order to have learned an
optimal policy); when Ii,G(t) = Ci,G , i has learned enough about the joint behavior of the agents in
G for an optimal policy. We similarly define Ii,env(t) ∈ [0, Ci,env] to be the amount of information
agent i has learned about the stationary portions of its environment.
Ii(t) = Ii,env(t) +
∑
G⊆[N ]−i
Ii,G(t) (1)
For any agent i and any χ ∈ {env} ∪ 2[N ]−i , define∆↑Ii,χ(t) to be the amount of new information
agent i learns about χ at time t. In order to give an explicit formula for∆↑, we note that the amount
of new information gained should be a function of the amount of information left to learn about χ.
We denote this function by Λ in (2).
∆↑Ii,χ(t) = Ki,χΛ(Ci,χ − Ii,χ(t− 1)) (2)
In (2), the value Ki,χ ∈ [0, 1] (which we refer to as the learning rate coefficient) allows for scaling
Λ separately for each i, χ to account for differences in learning rate. Aside from scaling by Ki,χ, Λ
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should be the same for all agents, because the shape of this “learning curve” will depend on factors
that are independent of the agents involved, such as properties of the learning algorithm itself; across
different agents, only the rate of learning (i.e., the “steepness” of this curve) may change, which is
accounted for by the scaling factor Ki,χ.
Next, consider a situation where Ki,χ = 1 (a very optimistic learning rate, for the sake of example),
and Λ(x) = x. In this case ∆↑i,χ(t) = Ci,χ − Ii,χ(t); that is, agent i learns all the remaining
unlearned information about χ. Learning everything in a single time step is the best any algorithm
can ever hope for and no algorithm can do better than this. Thus, we restrict our interest to functions
where Λ(x) < x for all x ∈ [0, 1] (in practice, Λ will likely be much smaller).
Finally, we will find it useful to refer to the total information gain of agent i at time t, which we
shall write as∆↑Ii(t).
∆↑Ii(t) = ∆
↑Ii,env(t) +
∑
G⊆[N ]−i
∆↑Ii,G(t) (3)
2.1.2 Modeling Nonstationarity Via Information Loss
We now address how to model the nonstationarity issue in our informational model. One way to
view the nonstationarity issue is that from the view of an individual agent i, as other agents learn new
knowledge, their behavior changes, thus rendering invalid some of the “knowledge” (or information)
agent i had about those agents. We model this phenomenon as information loss. Just as we defined
for any agent i ∈ [N ] and χ ∈ 2[N ]−i ∪ {env} the information gain at time t as ∆↑Ii,χ(t), we
define the information loss as ∆↓Ii,G(t). Note however, that we do not define ∆
↓Ii,env since
information about the environment will never be invalidated (since it is nonstationary), and so there
is no environmental information loss.
∆↓Ii,G(t) =
∆↑IG(t)Ii,G(t− 1)
IG(t− 1) + ∆↑IG(t)
(4)
Similar to information gain, we can write the total amount of information lost by agent i at time step
t as∆↓Ii(t) =
∑
G⊆−i
∆↓Ii,G(t).
2.1.3 The Full Update Process
With∆↑ and∆↓ defined, we can now fully specify the information update process. Specifically, we
define Ii,χ(t) as a recurrence relation below.
Ii,env(t) = Ii,env(t− 1) + ∆
↑Ii,env(t)
Ii,G(t) = Ii,G(t− 1) + ∆
↑Ii,G(t)−∆
↓Ii,G(t)
The process unfolds as follows. Agent i begins with some small amount of information Ii,χ(0).
At each time step, agent i gains information equal to ∆↑Ii(t) and loses information according
to ∆↓Ii(t). We would like to know at which time step all agents have learned (nearly) all the
information they need. We allow for some small ǫ > 0 tolerance, and we wish to find the first time
step t∗ for which Ii(t
∗) > 1 − ǫ for all agents i ∈ [N ]. For convenience, we denote by I−1i (ξ) the
minimum time step t for which Ii(t) ≥ ξ.
Our model is incredibly general as it depends on many parameters that specify properties of both
the game to be learned and the learning algorithm used to learn the policies of agents. An instance
of this model (which we call a Multi-Agent Informational Learning Process) can be fully specified
by all of the parameters described above, which we summarize in Definition 6 below.
Definition 6 (MAILP). AMulti-Agent Informational Learning Process (MAILP) is a fully specified
by:
• A number of agentsN
• The coordination tensor set {Ci,G}, where i ∈ [N ] and G ⊆ [N ]−i, with the property that
for all agents i ∈ [N ], we have
∑
G⊆[N ]−i
Ci,G ≤ 1. The dependence on the environment
is then defined for agent i as Ci,env = 1−
∑
G⊆[N ]−i
Ci,G .
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• The collection of learning rates {Ki,χ}, where i ∈ [N ] and χ ∈ 2
[N ]−i ∪ {env}
• The learning shape function Λ: [0, 1] → [0, 1], which should be an increasing function
such that Λ(x) ≤ x for all x ∈ [0, 1].
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